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IN THE

SUPREME COURT
OF THE

State of Utah
C. G. EKLUND, doing business under the

name of:
C. G. EKLUND ELECTRIC COMPANY,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
and
No. 7256

H. B. EMPEY,
Interpleaded Plaintiff,
- vs CLINTON L. ELWELL,
Defendant and Appellant.

STATEMENT BY RESPONDENT
This is an action which involves the question of an undisclosed principal, and arose out of the facts as set forth in
appellant's "Statement of the Case" and the further facts as set
out herein together with some controverted matters which
respondent hereby attempts to correct and clarify.
The only questions for determination in this case were
aptly stated by counsel for defendant and appellant as follows:
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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"The only question is as to who is entitled to be paid and
what amount and whether it was installed in a workmanlike
manner" (Bill Qf Exceptions, Page 16.) Now as to corrections
and clarification, it appears that respondent owns and operates
a store at Ogden, Utah, from which he sells electrical merchandise and equipment. (Bill of Exceptions Page 12.) That attached to respondent's complaint and made a part of the same
and marked "Exhibit A" he set forth an itemized statement of
every article of merchandise or equipment sold by him, and
put in the building of the appellant, together with the price
of each article. (See Exhibit "A" attached to the complaintBill of Exceptions, Page 002.) That respondent also set forth
a·n itemized statement of each hour of labor of each man, who
did any work on appellant's building and the date he did said
work. (Exhibit "B" attached to the complaint-Bill of Exceptions, Page 003). That the established scale of wage~ for an
electrician at Ogden, Utah, during said time of ip.stalling said
equipment was $2.2~ per hour, and for an apprentice $1.25 per
hour; that these were reasonable and the going prices therefor,
(Bill of Exceptions, Page 18.) and that the price for the said
electrical equipment was likewise reasonable therefor. (Bill of
Exceptions, Page 15). That the total sums amounted to $1499.05.
That defendant and appellant presented no evidence in opposition to these figures, so it must be assumed these amounts are
reasonable and correct. That respondent controverts the alleged
facts appearing on bottom of page 2 of appellant's brief which
says,-"that plaintiff, so far as defendant knew, claimed no
interest in the contract until long after Empey discontinued
work at the job." (Bill of Exceptions, Pages 007 and 017). However the facts are much to the contrary, for in November, 1946
(long prior to the completion of the job) the appellant and
respondent and Empey talked over the telephone, and respondent asked appellant for some money and appellant said, "the
finance company would pay it if we signed a release". (Bill of
Exceptions, Pages 29 and 30). No question then in appellant's
mind who he owed. Again, the same parties, except Empey, had
a conversation at the Bank and appellant said, "Will you send
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me a statement of labor and material because 1 have got track
of every hour on the job and the material." (Bill of Exceptions,
Page 26). No question then in mind of appellant who he owed,
either. The trial court also found that the appellant knew that
respondent was the real party in interest in November, 1946,
(Bill of Exceptions, Page 030) also see (Bill of Exceptions, Page
21); and further respondent controverts paragraph 2 from top
of page 4 of appellant's brief, in this, the court found that
Empey owed defendant $137.23 and allowed an offset of this
amount against the amount of the judgment awarded to plaintiff, in the sum of $1499.05 thereby reducing the amount of the
judgment plaintiff had ·recovered against defendant from
$1499.05 to $1361.82. The fact is, there was n.o offset against
Empey, as he was awarded no judgment. (Bill of Exceptions,
Page 031). Further, respondent controverts paragraph 4 from
top of page 4 of appellant's brief wherein he states that "plaintiff did not go out to the job, (appellant's brief, Page 4.)
"whereas, the fact is plaintiff did go there several times. (Bill
of Exceptions, Page 22).
It is further stated by appellant that the plaintiff and respondent never did talk to the defendant, until after the job was
just about completed, or after it was completed, and that he
never did submit a statement to defendant neither before, at
the time of, or after completion of the work. (Appellant's Brief,
Page 5). Again this is not the fact and is misleading. The cor~_
rect statement is that in November, 1946, several months before completion of the job, the plaintiff and the interpleaded
plaintiff, Empey, discussed the job with the defendant, and requested him to pay some money; (Bill of Exceptions, Pages 29
and 30) and further, the plaintiff did submit, a statement to
the defendant on this job at defendant's request (Bill of Exceptions, Page 26) and the bill was submitted in the name of
Empey Electric Company, and the reason it was submitted in
the name of Empey Electric Company was because the defendant requested that it be written that way. (Bill of Exceptions,
Page 28 and 29). The defendant complains that the plaintiff.
kept no records of this job, except, as they were handed to him
3
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by Empey. The fact is, that Empey was plaintiff's foreman and
had charge of all work done on the job (Bill of Exceptions,
Page 15 and 37 and 38), and handed in his time to the plaintiff
as any other foreman would do, and the plaintiff paid the bills.
(Bill of Exceptions, Page 13 and 15). The appellant complains
that the plaintiff did not finish the job on the Elwell property,
but that the Murphy Niel Elecvic Company was called in to do
part of the work to be done by Empey. (Appellant's Brief, Page
u). This statement is misleading, in that, it fails to state the
reason that the work was not completed by the plaintiff or
Empey; the fact is, that the defendant Elwell "told us not to go
back and finish it any more," and the job was not completed
by Empey or plaintiff, neither was Elwell charged by the plaintiff or Empey, with the work done by the Murphy Neil Electric
Company, consequently, he suffered no damage thereby. (Bill
of Exceptions, Page 39 and 62.).
CROSS ASSIGNMENTS OF ERRORS
Comes now the respondent and hereby makes and assigns
the following errors, for the purpose of obtaining a modification of a portion of the Amended Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and also, of the Amended judgment herein, towit:
1. That the court erred in making and entering its Findings of Fact, being a part of paragraph No. 5 of the Amended
Findings of Fact, in this, that it allowed defendant an offset in
the amount of $137.23 against the plaintiff, thereby leaving a
balance due the plaintiff against the defendant in the sum of
$1361.82, instead of the amount of $1499.05. (Bill of Exceptions,
Page 030).
2. That the court erred in making and entering its Conclusions of Law being 'that part of said paragraph of the
Amended Conclusion's qf Law, in this, that it entitled plaintiff
to a judgment against defendant in the sum of $1361.82 instead
of the amount of $1499.05. (Bill of Exceptions, Page 030).'
3.

That the court erred in making and entering its judg4
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ment, being paragraph No.4 of the Amended judgment, in this,
that it decreed that the defendant offset the sum of $137.23
against the amount found due the plaintiff of $1499.05, thereby
reducing the amount the plaintiff could recover against the defendant to the sum of $1361.82 (Bill of Exceptions, Page 031).
ARGUMENT IN SUPPORT OF RESPONDENT'S CROSS
ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR.
Discussing respondent's cross assignments numbered 1, 2,
and 3, respondent will consider them together as they revolve
about essentially the same point, that is, the trial court found
that the Interpleaded Plaint.iff Empey was indebted to defendant
in the sum of $137.23, and that defendant was entitled to an
offset in this amount against the plaintiff which reduced plaintiff's judgment from $1499.05 to $1361.82 and respondent contends that this reduction should not have been allowed for the
reason that all parties were before the court and because that
said indebtedness occurred long prior to the instant transaction
and that a judgment against the interpleaded plaintiff Empey,
in favor of defendant would have been proper in the premises
instead of deducting this obligation from the amount awarded
the plaintiff. If the interpleaded plaintiff had not been before
the court, then, perhaps this offset would have be'en justified,
but as all three parties were heard, this defendant should have
no greater claim or right against the plaintiff, than he would
have had against the interpleaded plaintiff, if the suit were
between the defendant and· the interpleaded plaintiff. Therefore, the court should have awarded a judgment in plaintiff's
favor against defendant for $1499.05 and awarded a judgment
in defendant's favor against the interpleaded plaintiff in the
amount of $137.23. No citations, I feel, need be given in upholding this contention.
ARGUMENT

1.
The appellant's first assignment claims the trial court erred
in overruling his demurrer wherein he alleged that the com5
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

plaint of plaintiff did not state facts sufficient to constitute a
cause of action, and, in support thereof, claims the allegations
are not statements of fact but are conclusions-"that labor
and materials were furnished in the name of Empey Electric
Company for plaintiff's benefit"; that a statement was submitted in the same name, and that it was for "plaintiff's use
and benefit"-and that the Empey Co. claims no right or interest in the sum owing and that appellant does not know whether the said Empey Company is "an individual or partnership or
otherwise". If these are conclusions, they have been upheld by
the courts as proper allegations. To plead by using the common
counts in this state has been done so frequently, and sustained
so often, as a proper method of pleading, that it seems odd to
have it challen_ged now. However, I quote the following in
support of the same:
"Where a contract has been fully performed and nothing remains to be done but to pay the money, the plaintiff
may elect either to declare specifically or upon the common
counts." 4 American Jurisprudence 498; 3 California Jurisprudence 384; 2 Ban crofts Code Pleading, Page 1302; Willett & Burr Alpert 185 Pac 976; Castagino V. Ball etta 23 Pac
127; Maynes V. Galliano 205 Pac 950; Wilcox V. Newman
190 Pac 138; 129 Pac 356 (Utah). According to the great
weight of authority the common counts in assumpsit may
be used in stating a cause of action under the codes. 2 Bancrofts Code Pleading, Page 1357, 1358; 4 American Jurisprudence 522 ;_see 114 Pac. 143 (State vs. District Court of
Boxelder County).
If the pleading was uncertain or unintelligible, then the
proper procedure for appellant was to have filed a special demurrer, and ask for clarification of these matters. He did not do this,
hence, he will be precluded now from raising the question. It
has been held many times, demurrant is deemed to have waived
this objection if he fails to raise it in proper time (Child vs.
Gillis Construction Company 129 Pac. 356). This case says:
"under such circumstances, the objection, not having been
6
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taken by special demurrer, must in this jurisdiction be deemed
as waived." (See also 114 Pac. 143).
However, in spite of appellant's objections to respondent's
complaint, he shows conclusively, in his Amended Answer, that
he understood all the said objections, as he sets up the answer to
each one and even states that Empey was an individual doing
business under the name of Empey Electric Company. From all
the issues in the case, joined by the complaint, the amended
answer and the replies, and not from plaintiff's complaint alone,
did the trial court hear the evidence and apply the law, the
appellant was not surprised or prejudiced in any manner, as a
·reading of his amended answer will definitely show. And, in
addition, all three interested parties were before the court and
each testified in his own behalf. The interpleaded plaintiff,
Empey, was brought into court on an order of appellant and he
should not now complain when he brought all parties concerned
before the court.
The appellant also contends that plaintiff's complaint is
defective in its allegations in respect to "undisclosed principal·
and agent and otherwise." Our Supreme Court has set out the
allegations necessary to support a complaint on the above
theory, and it has been followed in the case now before the
court: (Child vs. Gillis Construction Company 129 Pac. 356.) The
cases cited by appellant are not in point. Our own court has
decided what is required in this .state and it is still the law. (See
Child vs. Gillis Construction Company above). I shall not argue
the matter further in respect to the necessary allegations or
the law governing undisclosed principal in our jurisdiction, as
the Child vs. Gillis Construction Company case above seems to
have settled that.
In appellant's assignment No. 2 he claims evidence was
admitted improperly by the trial court, in showing that Empey
was a foreman for respondent on the defendant's job. In view
of all the facts in evidence, this contention can hardly be sus7
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tamed. Elwell, in his amended answer, refers to Empey having
supervision and control of all the work; and together with two
other men, did all the work mentioned in the complaint, and
that he brought all the equipment to Elwell's place and installed
it. Now, if this was not enough to show that Empey acted as
plaintiff's foreman on defendant's job and also other jobs, I call
the court's attention to this testimony: (Mr. Empey was testifying)
Q What were your duties as an employee of Eklund
Electric Company?

A Oh, I laid out the jobs and developed some of them.
also put material on the job; rounded up material that
was hard to get. Kept the jobs agoing.
Q

Who did you report to in respect to these matters?

A

Mr. Eklund.

Q

From whom did you take your orders?

A

From Mr. Eklund.

Q

And who paid you?

A

Mr. Eklund.

Q And who supplied you with the material you needed
on these jobs?

A

Eklund Electric.

Q Mr. Empey, I hand you Plaintiff's purported Exhibit A, and ask you to tell me what that is?

A

That is a weekly time report.

Q

And who prepared that report?

A

I did my self.
8
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Q That is in your own hand-writing?
A That is right.

Q And does that have the hours that were put on
the job at the Elwell property?
A That is right. It has the hours there and also other
hours.

Q In other words, at that time you had a number of
jobs?
A That is right.

Q That you were supervising?
A That is right.

Q Under the Eklund Electric?
A That is right.

Q And this sheet you say was made once each week?
A

Yes

Q I notice on this sheet at the top there is one column
to the left without any name. Who does that refer to?

A That goes to Munford.

Q There is one in the middle without a name?
A That is mine.
Q At the left side there is a column marked "Helper."
Who is that?

A That is Mr. Shaw.

Q Does that go all the way through that way?
A
week.

Q

That is right. That is in rotation, and goes in every
You tabulate the hours put in each week?
9
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A

Yes, sir.

Q At the end of the week each person gets paid for
what he did during that week?
A

That is right. Gets paid on Monday morning.

Q Is this sheet correct as to the number of hours?
A

Yes, sir.

Q

To whom do you hand this when it is prepared?

A

Mr. Eklund.

Q And on these sheets I notice in different places it
says, "Gas Station, 8th and Washington." Is that the Elwell
property?

A That is what it meant. (See Bill of Exceptions,
Pages 37 and 38).
The evidence shows, without any contradiction, that Eklund
paid for ali labor and all material that went into Elwell's buildings. As stated before, if there was any controversy between
Eklund and Empey as to who was entitled to the money, there
might be a point to Elwell's assignment, but, as there is none
whatsoever, this question is largely academic.
It is further contended by the appellant, that the complaint
does not allege that either party hereto was licensed to do the
work. This question was never raised by the defendant in his
demurrer, amended answer, order or reply. In fact, counsel
st~ted in open court at the trial, "The only question is as to
who is entitled to be paid and what amount and whether it was
installed in a workmanlike manner", and, taking counsel at his
word, the case was tried on just those issues. Now that the decision was adverse, he seeks to raise a different issue. During the
trial, the evidence showed (Bill of Exceptions, Pages 19 and 31)
that Empey had worked for Eklund for several years and Eklund had always taken out the licenses; that during 1946, Empey
10
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took out these licenses, as agent for Eklund, as Eklund was
working at a government depot near Ogden, Utah; that Empey
was a licensed contractor, and that all the work done on defendant's property was done under the guidance, control and
supervision of Empey, a licensed contractor. (Defendant's
amended answer, paragraph 3 thereof; Bill of Exceptions, page
017 and also appellant's brief on page 4; and Bill of Exceptions,
Pages 20 and 31). What more could Elwell ask on any job?
The statute 79 - SA - 1 Utah Code Annotated, 1943, which
appellant relies on is primarily to protect the public against
would be contractors who are not qualified by training or experience to do competent contracting work. But, in the instant
case all the work was supervised and done under the direction
of Empey, who was a qualified, licensed contractor, so in reality
the defendant was protected as the law intended him to be. The
United States Supreme Court has this to say regarding this
very section :
"Neither this nor any other section of the Utah statutes
provides in express language that a contract employing an
unlicensed contractor to perform services, falling within
the field of his trade, shall be unenforceable". (Dow vs.
United States. lS4 F 2nd 707, 710, construing above section 79 - SA - 1).
The cases cited by appellant are not in point as they do not
relate to facts as they arise in this case, and counsel has very
candidly said, "We have found no case directly in point under
our statutes" (Appellant's Brief, Page 1S).
As to the salient points in this case, aside from supercritical
objections, we have the following: There is no dispute that
Empey and two other men performed labor for Elwell at his
request, and that certain electrical equipment was put into
Elwell's buildings; there is no dispute and no evidence to the
contrary, that Eklund furnished and paid for all material as
well, and that he paid for all labor performed there; also, there
was no evidence given by Elwell to controvert that the reason11
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able going wage for an electrician was $2.25 per hour and for
an apprentice $1.25 per hour; neither did Elwell offer any
evidence to dispute the testimony of Eklund and Empey that
the items of mat~rial set forth in plaintiff's Exhibit "A", attached to complaint, were not installed in his buildings, nor
that the hours of labor set forth in Plaintiff's Exhibit "A" were
not actually performed on Elwell's property. This being the
situation, the only important question in this case is, who should
Elwell pay? He says, in effect, I did not contract with Eklund,
therefore, I will not pay him, but I do owe Empey, and I want
to pay him. At the trial, Elwell gave some evidence that Empey
owed him $497.81 due from diverse transactions, and requested
that these be offset against the amount he owed Empey. The
trial court found these items were not owed by Empey except
$137.23 and then did offset this amount against the judgment
the court awarded to Eklund, so, in effect, Elwell obtained the
same result he had asked for, except, the judgment creditor was
called Eklund instead of Empey. Had the court awarded the
judgment to Empey against Elwell, the amount of the judgment
would have been identical. And, in further proof of this, Elwell
in the prayer of his amended answer, sums up the case this way:
"That this Honorable Court fix and determine the reasonable value of the work and labor accomplished and the
materials and equipment furnished this defendant by the
said H. B. Empey; that this defendant be given credit upon
said sum for the sum of $497.81 due and owing this defendant from the said H. B. Empey and that Empey be given

judgment for the balance."
The trial court actually followed the procedure suggested
by Elwell, but in so doing, found a different amount due Elwell
from Empey, and found the balance owing after the full offset
due to Eklund, instead of Empey and yet, in no way has increased the burden on Elwell, but has left it just the same, as if
the judgment had been· awarded Empey.·
Elwell might have some point on his contention, if Eklund
and Empey both claimed the money, ~ut the fact is, Empey does
12
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1..:

not claim any part of it. It is alleged by Eklund that he is the
owner and holder of the claim. Empey testified under oath that
Eklund had paid him and the men for all labor they had put on
Elwell's buildings, and for all material; and that he claimed
nothing against Elwell, and that the money, owing for th~ job,
was due to Eklund. Certainly, und1er this state of facts, Elwell
would have no legal excuse for not paying Eklund and in so
doing, would settle the matter in full between all parties con·cerned.
Appellant's assignment No. 3 states that the trial court
erred in refusing to grant a non-suit against the plaintiff. The
court did not err. Elwell has already referred to this same point
before, and urged tha-t the agreement was made between himself and Empey, and that no matter what happened after that,
Empey would be the only person he would have to deal with,
and that he never knew of Eklund in the transaction. Yet it
appears, from the evidence, that Elwell "hollered" to Eklund
as he came out of a bank and told him, "to get that statement
to me right away if you expect to get your money and 'the statement better be right". Why did Elwell say this, if he did not
know that Empey was employed by Eklund? Or, that he did
not know Eklund was the real party concerned in the deal? The
fact is, that Elwell knew Eklund was furnishin_g all the material
and all labor or the above conversation would be meaningless.
Elwell employed Empey on a time and material basis and thereafter it was discovered (giving Elwell the benefit of everything)
that Eklund was the undisclosed principal. As a common sense
matter, what difference would it make whether Eklund sued as
an undisclosed principal and recovered, or if Empey sued as a
trustee for his principal and recovered? As a fact, you have
the principal and agent appearing in this case, as plaintiffs
anyway. Somebody furnished labor and material in the work
done on Elwell's buildings, and paid for it, and Elwell is now
being asked to pay. All parties were before the court, and the
court decided the amount due, decided the set-off due Elwell,
deducted it from the sum owing to Eklund, and ordered a judgment be entered for the balaqce. Both Eklund and Empey agree
13
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that th ebalance owing belongs to Eklund; that Empey has been
fully paid ~or his labor by Eklund and that Eklund furnished all
material. How could there be error in the refusal of the trial
court to grant the nonsuit against the plaintiff?
Assignment No.4 of Appellant's brief asks for a reversal of
this decision, for the reason, that the evidence submitted by
plaintiff was insufficiently competent to support the Amended
findings of Fact. This same question has been submitted to
this same court many times. I believe the answer given is usually
the same . .If there is any competent evidence to support the
Findings of the trial court, in a law case, this court will not
disturb those findings. (Appellant's cases cited so held.) There
may be evidence on both sides of each issue, but it is the duty
of the trial court, to determine where the preponderance or
weight of the evidence lays. In this case the trial court has done
that, but, notwithstanding, appellant wants this court to try. the
issues again in this appeal. The trial court has found allegations
of Elwell's amended answer untrue, and not supported by the
preponderence of the evidence, except, as to one item for
$137.23, and the court allowed this to be deducted from the
amoupt found due the plaintiff, and, instead of awarding a
judgment for $1499.05, it reduced this amount in Elwell's favor
to the sum of $1361.82. Certainly, even a casual reading of the
evidence in this matter will disclose, that Eklund has supported
each finding with competent evidence and that the trial court
made_ no error in its findings.
The appellant further contends, that the Conclusions of
Law and rendering judgment in favor of respondent and
against appellant, is also an error, and then proceeds to say
that the court should have dismissed the case as against the
plaintiff and left all the matters to be determined then between
Empey and Elwell, and in so doing, the court would have found
a judgment in favor of Empey in a sum of not to exceed $524.47.
But the point appellant has forgotten, is this, that all the evidence Elwell had against Empey has been already presented in
this action, and that Empey was present and that Empey testi14
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fied in this case; that both parties have had their day in court,
to the same extent as if Eklund had been excluded, and they
had carried on as between themselves. What greater rights could
appellant ask for than he has already received? All the evidence
he had, he has given to the court. What more could our law give
him? Appellant then contends by saying that a judgment should
have been found in favor of Empey and against Elwell, or if
not, then in favor of Eklund as an undisclosed principal, and
against Elwell, but not to exceed $524.47. On this question of
amount, the court found all of Elwell's items not proper charges
against Empey, except one, and so denied the balance. The trial
court found Eklund the real party in interest and awarded him
a judgment for $1361.82. There was no evidence given by Elwell to dispute the material put into his dwellings, or the reasonable value thereof. Therefore, the court's findings on this
allegation must be assumed true. Neither was any evidence
given by Elwell to dispute the labor costs, and likewise, they
must be assumed to be correct. This being the case, Elwell owes
some one $1499.05 less $137.23, the offset the trial court allowed
him. It seems to respondent, the only big question raised in this
case by Elwell is to whom does he owe this money? He says he
wants to pay it. The evidence shows Eklund furnished all labor
and material. Empey says, ''I have been paid by Eklund and I
do not claim any of this sum". It is due to Eklund. In view of
these facts, what difference does it make to Elwell who he 'pays,
when all parties concerned are before the court, and the court
has found Elwell owes one and not the other. In dollars and
cents it is the same no matter which gets paid.
In conclusion respondent contends that he is the real party
in interest.
That competent evidence has beer:t given in support of his
allegations.
That the appellant has not been prejudiced in any way.
That the offset of $137.23 deducted from the amount
awarded to him should have been a judgment against Empey,
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and should not have been charged against his amount of judgment, and that respondent is entitled to a judgment against
Elwell in the sum of $1499.05.
The only matter for determination in this case is well stated
by counsel for appellant as follows: "The only question is as
to who is entitled to be paid and what amount and whether it
was installed in a workmanlike manner". (Bill of Exceptions,
Page 16.)
This being the case then, who is entitled to the money, Eklund or Empey?
The judgment of the district court in the above entitled
action should therefore, be affirmed, with the above modification.
Respectfully submitted,
P. LEROY NELSON
Attorney for respondent.
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